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Abstract
This paper studies the enforcement abilities of authorities with a limited commitment
to punishing violators. Commitment of resources sufficient to punish only one agent is
needed to enforce high compliance of an arbitrary number of agents. Though existence
of other, non-compliance equilibria is generally inevitable, there exist punishment rules
suitable for a limited authority to assure that compliance prevails in the long run under
stochastic evolution.
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1 Introduction
Centralized authorities, such as governments, or decentralized ones, such as peers, use
threats of punishment to enforce norms. However the authority, whether centralized or
decentralized, achieves compliance only if it is able to commit to the punishment threat.
Punishment is often costly, and hence an important determinant of the authority’s
success at enforcement is the amount of resources committed for punishment. In this
paper I argue that both kinds of authorities are similar in that they can enforce high
compliance of many agents with only few committed resources. The argument is as
follows: suppose that the authority is limited in that it can commit only resources that
suffice to punish just one agent by an amount higher than the agent’s cost of compliance.
Then, the authority’s punishment threat induces among the agents a game with an
equilibrium, in which all agents comply, as no agent wishes to deviate individually. For
a centralized authority this implies that it is able to control an arbitrary number of
subordinates as long as it is able to control one. Similarly, it is possible to apply this
observation to decentralized peer enforcement in a public good game with punishment
option. N players, each committing one unit for punishment, can enforce individual
contributions of approximately N units, and to collect altogether approximately N2
units.
However, even though a small punishment commitment may deter individual defec-
tors from deviating, the existence of a non-compliance equilibrium would appear to be
unavoidable. The committed resources are insufficient to punish all and therefore, if
no agent comply, the punishment of each is small compared to the cost of compliance.
Yet, as shown below, any limited authority may avoid the non-compliance equilibrium
— at least in the long run — by choosing a proper punishment rule. The supporting
argument is contingent on the authority’s ability to punish colluding violators at least
slightly. I divide authorities into two categories along this line. Collusion-vulnerable
authorities cannot punish if all agents coordinate on the same level of non-compliance.
Anger-based peer enforcement is a prime example, because punishing after a perfect
collusion would require the punisher to be angry with peers who have perpetrated the
same offense as herself.1 Collusion-resistant authorities are able to punish by at least
some amount even after a perfect collusion. The punishment of each colluding agent
can be arbitrarily small so even an authority with limited committed resources can be
1Decentralized authority based on peer enforcement may more frequently belong to this category but even
a centralized authority such as a government may be constrained, for instance politically, to punish agents
unified in a common non-compliance action.
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collusion-resistant.
Let us first present a punishment rule which eliminates the non-compliance equilibria
yet which is suitable for a limited collusion-resistant authority. The rule requires the
authority to commit to punishing only the worst violator. In the case of a tie the au-
thority divides the punishment equally among the worst violators which in turn induces
a dominance solvable game among the agents. The lowest possible compliance level
is dominated as it guarantees punishment, and an increase in compliance just above
the second lowest level saves the violator from punishment. Elimination continues by
induction until only high compliance levels remain in the strategy sets.
A collusion-vulnerable authority, in contrast, cannot use the above “punish-the-
worst” rule as it requires slight punishment of all players even after a perfect collusion.
An equilibrium in which no players comply inevitably exists under a collusion-vulnerable
authority as no player can be punished in such an equilibrium. To assess which equilib-
rium prevails in the long run, I build a stochastic, evolutionary model along the lines
of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). Agents occasionally but rarely deviate from their
best responses and experiment with a random action. As demonstrated below, only a
high level of compliance survives the evolution under a simple punishment rule.
This application of stochastic evolution is similar to that of Kandori (2003) who
examines a public good game (without punishment option). Kandori, in line with psy-
chological game theory, assumes intrinsic motivation to adhere to norms as long as others
adhere to it and analyzes the resulting coordination problem. Occasional mutations —
deviations from best responses — cause shifts of the norm. Downward shifts require
fewer mutations than upward shifts in Kandori’s model. As a result, high contribu-
tion levels eventually decay and only low contributions prevail in the long run, exactly
as observed in experiments (see Ledyard, 1995). As shown below, adding a punish-
ment option to the public good game reverses Kandori’s result despite the fact that
the commitment to punishment is limited. Small upward shifts of norms require fewer
mutations than any downward shifts under a simple punishment rule. Therefore, for a
low rate of mutations, shifts, conditional that they happen, are almost always upward
and the stochastic evolution converges to high contribution levels. The evolution can
be observed in the laboratory also in this case: the contribution level typically increases
during public good experiments with punishment option (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
The paper at hand does not examine where the authority’s limited commitment
ability comes from. For that reason, I choose a black box approach for the motivation
of punishment. The authority is assumed to be able to commit to limited punishment.
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There is experimental evidence supporting this assumption for the case of peer enforce-
ment (e.g. Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986). Punishment is modelled in
this paper as an automatic, limited reaction governed by a punishment rule which is a
function of the individual compliance levels. The focus is on specifying rules assuring
high compliance under the constraint of limited punishment.
The analysis starts by examining an optimal punishment rule suitable for a collusion-
resistant authority in section 2. A collusion-vulnerable authority and its associated
coordination problem is studied in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Punishment Rule Suitable for a Limited Collusion-
Resistant Authority
This section reproduces the model in Steiner (2005). It formalizes the introductory ar-
gument that a collusion-resistant authority can always avoid non-compliance equilibria.
Though the authority of this section could be centralized or decentralized, the model is
formulated in the former setting, as I discuss its connection to tax enforcement at the
end of the section.
Each player i ∈ I = {1, . . . , N}, N ≥ 1, simultaneously chooses an action ci from
a common strategy set S = {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , L∆}, where ∆ is sufficiently small, ∆ < 1,
and L∆ ≥ N . The assumption of the dense grid is needed to enable a sufficiently small
increase in compliance. The grid is used as a technically convenient approximation of
the continuous strategy space, so the assumption is not substantial. The assumption
L∆ ≥ N assures that players are not physically precluded from high compliance. The
action profile of all players is denoted by c.
The authority has committed to a punishment rule p(.), p : SN → RN+ that allocates
punishment pi(c) ≥ 0 to each player i after the authority observes the realized strategy
profile. The authority committed to the rule before the players choose actions and the
commitment has been commonly observed by all players. The payoffs of the players are
ui(c) = −ci − pi(c). (1)
Thus ci is interpreted as the cost of compliance net of individual benefits of the com-
pliance, if these exist. (I, SN , {ui}Ni=1) is the punishment game. Only the one-stage
interaction of players is modelled here; the behavior of the (limited) authority is an
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assumption.
Enforcement of high compliance would be trivial if the authority could commit to
any punishment rule. However, the authority is limited in the sense that it is at most
able to commit to spending on punishment one unit per agent:
A1:
PN
i=1 pi(c)
N ≤ 1 for any c.
Despite assumption A1, there exists a punishment rule that induces a game with a
unique equilibrium in which the actions of all players are approximately N . Denote the
highest level below N by mcen, the lowest action among players by l, and the second
lowest by s with the convention that l = s if there is more than one player with the
lowest action. Let the punishment rule be
pi(c) =

N
mcen
(
min(s,mcen)− ci
)
if ci = l, l < s, and ci < mcen,
1 if ci = l, l = s, and ci < mcen,
0 otherwise.
(2)
The marginal punishment, which is Nmcen > 1 or
1
∆ > 1, suffices to motivate the player
with the lowest action to increase her action, as long as the lowest action is below mcen.
Yet the total punishment expenditures are always at most N because the punishment
is not too costly even in situations when many players coordinate on the same lowest
level, as then s = l and each colluder is punished only slightly. This exact punishment
rule is not necessarily practiced in reality; Proposition 1 simply demonstrates that a
rule inducing high compliance exists.
Proposition 1. 1. The punishment game with punishment rule (2) has a unique
equilibrium with all N players playing mcen.
2. Punishment rule (2) satisfies assumption A1.
Proof of the Proposition 1. 1. Actions larger than mcen are dominated by mcen because
a player who has chosen at least mcen is never punished. Moreover, the player with the
lowest action below mcen always wishes to increase her action by at least ∆ because the
increase of her compliance by ∆ decreases her punishment by Nmcen∆ > ∆ or by 1 > ∆.
Hence, the lowest level, 0, is dominated by level ∆. After elimination of {0,∆, . . . , k∆},
level (k + 1)∆ is dominated by (k + 2)∆ because (k + 1)∆ would be the lowest action
among the non-eliminated strategies, for k = 0, . . . , mcen∆ − 2. Thus, the game can be
solved by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Only mcen survives this process.
2. There is either only one player with the lowest action, in which case she is the
only one being punished. The punishment is largest in this case if s = mcen and ci = 0.
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Then the punishment is Nmcenmcen = N . Or there may be many players with the lowest
action, in which case s = l and each punishment is 1. Thus the cost is at most 1 unit
per player in both cases.
A limited authority fulfilling A1 cannot enforce higher actions than N , as this is the
highest possible punishment it can inflict on a deviator. The “punish-the-worst” rule is
thus the optimal rule.
Alm and McKee (2004) experimentally study several tax enforcement schemes and
document that a rule similar to the “punish-the-worst” rule indeed elicits high compli-
ance. The authors assume a coordination problem analogous to the one in the present
model: audit probability increases with the difference between the average and agent’s
reported income. This models the use of the Discriminant Index Function (DIF) scores
by the Internal Revenue Service in the United States. DIF is a statistical score indi-
cating levels of suspiciousness of tax returns; those with above average DIF are more
likely to be audited. Such an endogenous audit probability rule leads to a coordination
game, in which full evasion by all agents constitutes an equilibrium. The experiment
demonstrates that adding a small probability of a randomly allocated audit in a case
of perfect collusion prevents coordination on full evasion. The intuition is the same as
in the model of this section. Indeed, the experimental data show a gradual increase in
compliance, as players try to escape the gradually increasing lowest position.
3 Punishment Rule Suitable for a Limited Collusion-
Vulnerable Authority
This section examines long run sustainable compliance levels under a collusion-vulnerable
authority. Unlike in the previous section, such an authority cannot assure high compli-
ance in the short or medium run because zero compliance always constitutes an equilib-
rium. To compare the effectiveness of different punishment rules, I assume that players
occasionally, but rarely, experiment with a randomly chosen action. I look for compli-
ance levels that prevail in the long run.
For the sake of concreteness, the model is formulated in the setting of a public good
game with punishment option which mimics in gross features the experiments in Fehr
and Ga¨chter (2000, 2002). The next subsection describes the evolution in a fixed group
of players. A modification describing the evolution under a random matching protocol
is given in subsection 3.2.
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3.1 Partners Treatment
A fixed set of N ≥ 3 risk-neutral players repeatedly plays the public good game with
punishment option in rounds t ∈ N, and each player i chooses a contribution level cti from
the common strategy set S = {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , L∆}, L∆ ≥ N . S is of the same structure
as in section 2 but a denser grid is required, ∆ < 1N−1 . After the contributions c of all
players are made and observed by everyone, players automatically assign punishment
points to each other; pij denotes the punishment i assigns to j.
The punishment pij(c
t−1, ct) depends on the contribution levels of the previous and
current rounds in this section; pij : S
N × SN → R+. By allowing mild history depen-
dence, the model diverges from the experimental design of the partners treatment in
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), who excluded it in order to avoid reputation effects. The
reputation effects are excluded here by assuming myopic behavior. I can therefore per-
mit history-dependent punishment rules which are psychologically plausible and which
allow higher contributions than do memoryless rules. Although longer memories could
be considered, memory of length one turns out to be sufficient to support contribution
levels of approximately N , which is the highest possible level. History dependence in not
substantial for the qualitative results of the model. The enforceable contribution level
increases linearly in the number of players even under a memoryless rule, but as ∼ N2
instead of ∼ N . Only memoryless punishment rules are considered under the random
matching setup in subsection 3.2.
Players play myopic best responses to the previous action profile in each round t.2
That is, each player maximizes payoff under the punishment rules assuming that her
opponents will carry over their contributions ct−1 from the last round:
cti ∈ argmaxci
−ci −∑
j 6=i
pji
(
ct−1,
(
ci, c
t−1
−i
) ) . (3)
The public good does not enter the maximization problem; ci is interpreted as the
contribution costs net of the marginal increase of the public good. Also, the cost of
the punishment does not enter the maximization problem although the agents bear the
cost. The limited punishment is automatic and thus is not part of the agents’ decision
problem. Alternatively, I could presuppose a behavioral utility function under which the
limited punishment would be optimal, but the main claim is that a small willingness to
2The results would not be changed if players could adjust to their best responses only with a certain
probability.
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punish leads to high contributions. The exact motivation to punish is outside the focus
of this paper. The optimization problem (3) can be understood as a reduced form of a
more complex optimization with the punishment stage already solved.
The strategy set S and the punishment rules pij(., .) define a Markov process (S
N ,Q)
where the transition matrixQ is determined by (3). Note that it is a memoryless process,
despite the fact that the punishment rule is history dependent, because the optimization
problem (3) depends only on the last round contribution profile ct−1. The pair (SN ,Q)
is the unperturbed process.
Assumption A1 reformulated for the decentralized authority setting is:
A1’:
∑
j 6=i p
i
j ≤ 1 for all i and any ct−1, ct.
Assumption A1’ is stricter than A1 because it not only requires average expenses for
the punishment to be below 1, but also individual expenses of each player to be below
1. The next assumption prohibits players from punishing peers that have contributed
the same amount as themselves3:
A2: If cti = c
t
j then p
i
j = 0.
Assumption A2 implies that c = 0 is inevitably a steady state of the unperturbed
process, so at worst a punishment rule does not induce any cooperation and at best there
are multiple steady states. However, as demonstrated below, there exists a punishment
rule under which increases of norms are much less demanding than decreases. Hence
high contributions prevail in the long run.
In order to study the transitions between different steady states I introduce, following
the framework of stochastic evolution of Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993), occasional
deviations from the unperturbed process: each player plays best response with proba-
bility (1 − ²) whereas with probability ² a “mutation” happens — the player chooses
a random action from the uniform distribution on S. A perturbed system is a pair
(SN , Q(²)), where Q(²) are the transition probabilities, with ² > 0. The perturbed sys-
tem has a unique invariant distribution µ², which is close to µ∗ ≡ lim²→0 µ² for small
². Ellison (2000) provides an intuitive “mutation counting” technique for the computa-
tion of µ∗ based on the observation that step-by-step evolution passing through several
intermediate states, with each step requiring few mutations, is quicker than a sudden
evolutionary jump requiring the simultaneity of many mutations.
I utilize Ellison’s observation and design a punishment rule under which only one
mutation is needed for an increase in contributions by one level, but a decrease by any
number of levels requires more than one mutation. As a consequence, evolution reaches
3Which implies that players never punish themselves.
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high contribution levels more quickly than it escapes it. This intuition is formally
expressed in the following proposition. Let mpar be the highest contribution level below
N − 2 and denote by Mpar the state in which all players contribute mpar.
Proposition 2. There exists a punishment rule satisfying A1’, A2 under which Mpar
is the unique stochastically stable state, and the expected waiting time to reach Mpar is
of order O(²−1).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is based on the following lemma and the theorem in
Ellison (2000).
Lemma 1. There exists a punishment rule satisfying A1’, A2 for which:
1. Any common contribution level 0 ≤ c ≤ mpar, c ∈ S constitutes a steady state of
the unperturbed process.
1’. No other limit sets of the unperturbed process than those in 1. exist.
2. Deviation of only one player from a steady state with common contribution level
c suffices to induce transition to the steady state with level c + ∆, for any c < mpar,
c ∈ S.
3. Deviation of more than one player from a steady state with common contribution
level c is needed to induce transition to a steady state with a lower level, for any c ≤ mpar,
c ∈ S.
Proof of Lemma 1 is given Appendix A.
Having established Lemma 1, Proposition 2 is a consequence of Ellison’s (2000)
theorem that specifies the long run stochastically stable limit set in terms of radius and
modified coradius. The radius R(Ω) is the number of mutations needed to escape Ω and
hence property 3 in Lemma 1 and the fact that Mpar is the highest steady state assures
that R(Mpar) > 1. The modified coradius CR∗(Ω) is the maximal modified number of
mutations needed to reach Ω from other limit sets of the unperturbed process, where
the modified number reflects that step-by-step evolution is more probable than sudden
changes. In particular, a set Ω that is possible to reach through a series of one or zero
mutation steps from anywhere has CR∗(Ω) = 1; see Ellison (2000) for details. Property
2 in Lemma 1 guarantees that only one mutation is needed for transition from a steady
state with level c to level c+∆ and thus there is a path consisting of at most one mutation
steps to Mpar from any other state, and hence CR∗(Mpar) = 1. According to theorem 2
in Ellison (2000), R(Mpar) > CR∗(Mpar) implies that Mpar is the unique stochastically
stable state. The same theorem specifies the waiting time as O
(
²−CR∗(Mpar)
)
.
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Ellison provides an intuition for the speed of step-by-step evolution that translates
naturally to the current setting: An increase in the norm by one contribution level is
an ² probability event as it can be induced by one mutation. In contrast, a decrease in
contribution level is an ²2 or rarer event as at least two mutations are needed. Hence,
conditional on a transition occurring, it is almost always an upward shift, for small ².
It is worth noting that the waiting time O(²−1) to reach Mpar is of the least possible
order. The contribution level enforceable by an authority limited by A1’ and A2 is
bounded by N −1 because this is the maximal punishment a single deviator may suffer;
thus the modified “punish-the-worst” rule induces a nearly optimal contribution level.
3.2 Strangers Treatment
The model of the partners treatment in the previous subsection describes evolution
among a fixed set of players, evolving in isolation from the rest of the population. Alter-
natively, players may interact with different peers every round, in which case evolution
occurs simultaneously in a large population, from which the groups are drawn anew
each round. This subsection sketches evolution under the strangers treatment.
A population ofKN risk-neutral players is randomly matched each round intoK ≥ 2
groups of N ≥ 2 players to play the public good game with punishment option. The
strategy set S = {0,∆, 2∆, . . . , L∆}, L∆ ≥ N , is of the same structure as in sections 2
and 3.1 but the grid is denser, ∆ < 1KN−1 . In each round, players can punish only the
peers within the group they have been matched to and the punishment rules pij(c) are
history independent, pij : S
N → R+. As in section 3.1, punishment rules are required to
satisfy A1’ and A2. The unperturbed process is again the best response dynamics and
under the perturbed process, players choose the best response with probability 1 − ²
and with probability ² choose a random action from the uniform distribution on S, as
in section 3.1. Let mstr be the highest level below (N − 1) (K−1)NKN−1 ; it approaches N − 1
for large K and N . Let Mstr be the Markov state in which all players contribute mstr.
The counterpart of Proposition 2 of subsection 3.1 is:
Proposition 3. There exists a punishment rule satisfying A1’, A2, under which Mstr
is the unique stochastically stable state, and the expected waiting time to reach Mstr is
of order O(²−1).
Proof of the Proposition 3. The punishment rule (4 in Appendix A) without exception
satisfies all four properties in Lemma 1.4 Proof of property 1 and 1’ remains unchanged.
4mpar needs to be replaced by mstr in the punishment rule and in Lemma 1.
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Property 2 is implied by the inequality ∆ < 1KN−1 : suppose there is a single deviator
j contributing more than the norm c prescribes. Then the probability that j will be
matched with i is N−1KN−1 , and hence i’s expected punishment is
1
N−1
N−1
KN−1 , which equals
the right hand side of the inequality. Hence the inequality assures that one deviator is
sufficient to induce all other players to increase their contributions by ∆.
The inequalitymstr < (N−1) (K−1)NKN−1 implies property 3: suppose that ck = c ≤ mpar
for all k /∈ {i, j} and cj < c. Then a conservative estimate of the slope of the expected
punishment for player i is N−1mstr
(K−1)N
KN−1 > 1 because
(K−1)N
KN−1 is the probability that j will
not be in i’s group, thus i will be the only deviator in her group, and hence punished
by N−1mstr (c− ci).
The properties of Lemma 1 imply R(Mstr) > 1, CR∗(Mstr) = 1 and Proposition 3
is a consequence of Ellison’s (2000) theorem as it was in Proposition 2 of subsection
3.1.
The models in this section are not literal models of Fehr and Ga¨chter’s (2000, 2002)
experiments. Their grids of contribution levels in the strangers treatment experiments
were not as dense as Proposition 3 requires, the information structure of the partners
treatment in the (2000) experiment precluded history-dependent punishment, and, on
the other hand, punishment was cheaper in the experiments than in the model. Also,
while experimental subjects may have had a variety of motivations for contributing, the
model focuses solely on the contributions enforced by the threats of punishment. A
combination of Kandori’s (2003) model of intrinsic motivation and the models at hand
could provide even higher estimates of sustainable contribution equilibrium than do the
present models alone.
The models suggest that the high contributions are due to the game’s structure
that is focusing the limited committed resources of all players on one potential devia-
tor. Keeping the commitment ability fixed, the contributions increase linearly with the
number of players. This insight is experimentally confirmed by Carpenter (2005). who
documents positive group size effects in public good games with punishment option even
after controlling for the marginal group return of contributions.
Of course, the game requires quite a bit of information: the actions of all players
need to be monitored, which is feasible in small groups such as work teams. Still, the
effect can be noteworthy for a reasonable group size. Ten agents, each willing to spend
only one unit for punishment, are able to collect at least (10− 2) · 10 = 80 units for a
public good.
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4 Conclusions
The models demonstrate that the commitment necessary for successful norms enforce-
ment is small compared to the total cost of compliance of all agents. Agents in the
compliance equilibrium consider deviating off the equilibrium individually. Hence, to
support the compliance equilibrium, the authority needs only to be capable of substan-
tially punishing one agent.
Nevertheless, other, non-compliance equilibria may exist. The main claim of the
paper is that authorities can avoid these non-compliance equilibria by a proper punish-
ment rule, even if their commitment capabilities are low. A punishment rule focusing
on punishment of the worst offender creates competition among the agents and leads to
a unique equilibrium with high compliance levels.
However, authorities using such a rule need to be able to punish perfectly colluding
violators at least by a small amount, and many authorities fail to do so. Yet even such
collusion-vulnerable authorities can avoid the non-compliance equilibria in the long run.
They can introduce a punishment rule which deters revolts of a small fraction of players
and enables a small fraction of players to initiate at least a tiny increase in compliance.
Then, given a sufficiently small mutation rate, the increases are arbitrarily more times
probable. High compliance prevails in the long run.
The prime application of the collusion-vulnerable authority model is the public good
game with anger-driven punishment of free-riders. Even if the anger — a deviation from
the homo oeconomicus framework — is limited, it can go a long way towards modifying
equilibrium behavior. The public good game with punishment option is an instance of
an institution that efficiently utilizes this behavioral deviation; a systematic search for
other such institutions is needed.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. There exists a punishment rule satisfying A1’, A2 for which:
1. Any common contribution level 0 ≤ c ≤ mpar, c ∈ S constitutes a steady state of
the unperturbed process.
1’. No other limit sets of the unperturbed process than those in 1. exist.
2. Deviation of only one player from a steady state with common contribution level
c suffices to induce transition to the steady state with level c + ∆, for any c < mpar,
c ∈ S.
3. Deviation of more than one player from a steady state with common contribution
level c is needed to induce transition to a steady state with a lower level, for any c ≤ mpar,
c ∈ S.
Proof of Lemma 1. let the definitions of l and s remain as in section 2. Consider a
“modified punish-the-worst” rule:
pij =

1
mpar
(
min(s,mpar)− cj
)
if cj = l, cj < mpar, l < s, and ci > cj ,
1
N−1 if cj = l, cj < mpar, l = s, and ci > cj ,
0 otherwise,
(4)
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except for situations when player k starts a rebellion against a norm of a common
contribution level c in the previous round t−1, persists in that rebellion in round t, and
player j joins the rebellion; then the remaining players concentrate on punishing the
new free-rider j, not the old k. Formally, the exception states that (4) does not apply
at t when at t − 1 all players i 6= k contributed some common level ct−1i = c ≤ mpar
and k contributed ct−1k < c, and c
t
k = c
t−1
k , c
t
j < c, and c
t
i = c, for i /∈ {j, k} in round t.
Then all N − 2 players i /∈ {j, k} punish j in round t each by amount
pij =
1
mpar
(c− ctj).
The punishment rule suitable for the strangers treatment does not employ this exception.
This rule satisfies A1’ because either player punishes only one of her peers in which
case she spends at most 1mparmpar = 1 or she punishes many players and then she spends
at most (N − 1) 1N−1 = 1. The rule satisfies A2 because it prescribes to punish only
peers who have contributed less than the punisher. Let us verify that the modified
“punish-the-worst” rule satisfies all four properties in Lemma 1:
1. The best response to ct−1 = c and ct−i = c is
5 ct∗i = c. Hence a state in which all
players contribute c is a steady state of the unperturbed process.
2. Suppose cti > c, c
t
j = c < mpar for all j 6= i. The best response of j 6= i is c+∆,
the best response of i is c. Thus, at t+1, ct+1i = c, c
t+1
j = c+∆, and at t+2 all players
contribute c+∆ which becomes the new steady state of the unperturbed process.
3. Suppose that only one player has deviated from the common contribution level
in round t; ctj = c ≤ mpar for all j 6= i and cti < c. Then the exemption applies in t+ 1
and the best response of all players in t+ 1 is to contribute c.
1’. Consider a state c in which more than one contribution level is chosen. Let us
distinguish two cases: in case A, N − 1 players contribute some common c and the
contribution of only one player differs from c; case B includes all other situations. If
A arises, players converge to a common contribution level c or c + ∆ within one or
two rounds( see proofs of properties 2 and 3). In case B, the best response of each
player i is to contribute l−i + ∆ > l, where l−i is the lowest contribution among i’s
opponents. Therefore the lowest contribution increases in those rounds when case B
arises.67 Thus in each round either l increases or A arises, and because the set of
5To avoid confusion, ct−1i = c for all i and c
t
j = c for all j 6= i.
6This does not hold in situations described in the proof of property 2. Therefore the division of all situations
into categories A and B is necessary.
7In the case of the adaptation of the proof for subsection 3.2 the best response is l−i +∆ or higher.
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the contribution levels is finite, either l converges to mpar or A arises and under both
eventualities players converge to a common contribution level.
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